We shall give reconsideration to the problem of communicating the allegedly unique and unprecedented aspects that may be possessed by a literary work. In doing this we will distinguish two senses of uniqueness. The first of these, which we call objective uniqueness, is communicated without fundamental difficulty. It is given by a definite description in terms of properties which are entirely familiar but which occur in an unprecedented combination. Criticism’s overall task, however, demands concern for a second notion of uniqueness, (...) to which we apply the term qualitative uniqueness and which cannot be communicated, like the first, by any description in the informative sense. The critic, however, does come to grips with this second sense of uniqueness by using language expressively. In this connexion we shall argue that through the expressive use of language the critic can not only transmit something of the qualitative uniqueness of his object, but can do so without requiring, as some have supposed, the presence of the object itself. Thus, we will conclude, critical communication in the fuller sense is possible because the critic, like the poet, can use language affectively and expressively to get beyond the limitations of ordinary description so as to give what we shall call a representation of that which is qualitatively unprecedented in any distinctive literary work. (shrink)

Our response to representational art can be called "aesthetic" even if we are not "detached from cognitive and moral matters." for the pleasure we receive from "huckleberry finn" (dickie's example) is not based on its historical or sociological accuracy, Or on our agreement with its moral statements. We enjoy and value the novel because of its wit and irony, Which subvert and so transcend its cognitive and moral truths.

I agree with much of what is said in this article; and I also will quote Roland Barthes, but for a different purpose. But I believe that it is a mistake to judge contextualism by its theory rather than its practice. If we look carefully at what is actually done in contextualist criticism, we will find that the "contradictions in its basic premises" which trouble Wasiolek have also allowed it to overcome the limitations that a strict construction of "autonomy" would (...) impose. We will also find that what really distinguished contextualism, what the concept of autonomy leads to in practice, is not an impoverishment but a deepening and enrichment of the literary experience and, third, that the theoretical developments in other critical schools have vindicated at least one cardinal principle of contextualism, namely, that the meaning of a literary work is inherently ambivalent or indeterminate. By following the lead, we can, I believe, provide a better theoretical base for contextualism, although I am not sure that it would be or should be one that "includes the world rather than excludes it," as Wasiolek demands it. Lawrence W. Hyman professor of English at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, is the author of a book on Milton's poetry,The Quarrel Within, and articles on critical theory. He responds in this essay to Edward Wasiolek's "Wanted: A New Contextualism". Hyman has also contributed "CRITICAL RESPONSE: Harpsichord Exercises and My Lai Massacre" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

That there is something not altogether honest about a didactic novel can be seen once we imagine a novel which violates our political sympathies or our moral principles, such as a novel that shows the Nazis or the American soldiers at My Lai as heroes. We certainly would not like this novel. But could we refute it because of our certain knowledge that these men, in real life, were murderers? I don't think so, since a skillful writer could easily make (...) his characters act heroically in the situation—and even make us dislike their victims. Could we say that the situation is false? Perhaps, but since the actions and the characters are fictional, what does it mean to refute them? We can say that a novel is bad or unconvincing if the characters do not resemble people in real life or if the actions do not satisfy our sense of logic or probability. But these are literary objections, not political ones. And because the writer cannot be refuted by evidence from the real world, he cannot make pronouncements about this world. For example, even if there were evidence that no slave resembled Tom and no overseer resembled Legree, such evidence could not refute the novel Uncle Tom's Cabin. And as Moody Prior points out in his essay , our disagreement with the philosophy of spiritual, rather than physical resistance to slavery cannot take away the heroism of Tom's action. His final act of forgiveness is indeed Christ-like, and no philosophy of political activism which is validated by, let us say, our admiration for Tom within the novel cannot validate Tom's kind of inward action in the real world. If it did, then our admiration for Tom, a fictional character, would prelude our support for a more active resistance to oppression. But, of course, it does not, or at least it should not, if we are to see fiction as performing a different role than politics and philosophy. Lawrence W. Hyman, professor of English at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, is the author of The Quarrel Within: Art and Morality in Milton's Poetry. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, "The 'New Contextualism' Has Arrived: A Reply to Edward Wasiolek," appeared in the Winter 1975 issue. (shrink)